A tight quantitative version of Arrow's impossibility theorem

Abstract

The well-known Impossibility Theorem of Arrow asserts that any Generalized Social Welfare Function (GSWF) with at least three alternatives, which satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity and is not a dictatorship, is necessarily non-transitive. In 2002, Kalai asked whether one can obtain the following quantitative version of the theorem: For any ε>0, there exists δ=δ(ε) such that if a GSWF on three alternatives satisfies the IIA condition and its probability of non-transitive outcome is at most δ, then the GSWF is at most ε-far from being a dictatorship or from breaching the Unanimity condition. In 2009, Mossel proved such quantitative version, with δ(ε)=(-C/ε21), and generalized it to GSWFs with k alternatives, for all k ≥ 3. In this paper we show that the quantitative version holds with δ(ε)=C · ε3, and that this result is tight up to logarithmic factors. Furthermore, our result (like Mossel's) generalizes to GSWFs with k alternatives. Our proof is based on the works of Kalai and Mossel, but uses also an additional ingredient: a combination of the Bonami-Beckner hypercontractive inequality with a reverse hypercontractive inequality due to Borell, applied to find simultaneously upper bounds and lower bounds on the "noise correlation" between Boolean functions on the discrete cube.

0

Turn this paper into a lesson

ArcXiv compiles a structured reading guide from this paper's metadata: plain-English importance, contributions, prerequisite concepts, which sections to read first, flashcards, and a quiz. Grounded in the abstract, never invented.

Discussion (0)

Sign in to join the discussion.

Loading comments…