Effect of multiple degrees of ambivalence on the Naming Game

Abstract

We examine a modified Naming Game in the mean field where there are multiple degrees of ambivalence. Once an agent in one state fears an opinion one way or another, he or she moves one step in the appropriate direction. In the absence of zealots, the two consensus states are stable steady states and the uniform distribution is an unstable steady state. With zealots for one opinion only, there is a critical value below which there are three steady states and above which there is only one. Consensus in favor of the zealots' opinion is the steady state that always exists, and is stable. The second steady state is the uniform distribution in the absence of zealots, and moves away from the zealots' opinion as the number of zealots increases. This state is unstable. The last steady state starts at consensus against the zealots, and moves toward the zealots' opinion as the number of zealots increases. This state is stable. When zealots are added on both sides, the "beak" pattern observed for the Naming Game remains, with the region of multiple steady states growing with the addition of more intermediate states.