Collection-behavior based Multi-parameter Posted Pricing Mechanism for Crowd Sensing

Abstract

Crowd sensing is a new paradigm which leverages a large number of sensor-equipped mobile phones to collect sensing data. To attract more participants to provide good quality, bidding mechanisms that solicit the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism and its variants are natural fits for crowd sensing applications in mobile social networks. However, in practical continuous crowd sensing applications, where bids cannot be solicited and only posted pricing mechanisms can be implemented. Obviously, these mechanisms for continuous crowd sensing are not applicable. To tackle the issue, we propose a collection-behavior based multi-parameter posted pricing mechanism, not only to consider extensive user participating and sensing data submission quality under given budget constraints by applying all-pay auctions and posted pricing mechanisms, but also to maximize the coverage utilities by applying crowd aversion. Simulation results indicate that incentive mechanisms in our proposed framework outperform the best existing solution.