On the Solvability of Risk-Sensitive Linear-Quadratic Mean-Field Games

Abstract

In this paper we formulate and solve a mean-field game described by a linear stochastic dynamics and a quadratic or exponential-quadratic cost functional for each generic player. The optimal strategies for the players are given explicitly using a simple and direct method based on square completion and a Girsanov-type change of measure. This approach does not use the well-known solution methods such as the Stochastic Maximum Principle and the Dynamic Programming Principle with Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation and Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation. In the risk-neutral linear-quadratic mean-field game, we show that there is unique best response strategy to the mean of the state and provide a simple sufficient condition of existence and uniqueness of mean-field equilibrium. This approach gives a basic insight into the solution by providing a simple explanation for the additional term in the robust or risk-sensitive Riccati equation, compared to the risk-neutral Riccati equation. Sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of mean-field equilibria are obtained when the horizon length and risk-sensitivity index are small enough. The method is then extended to the linear-quadratic robust mean-field games under small disturbance, formulated as a minimax mean-field game.