Some Epistemic Extensions of G\"odel Fuzzy Logic
Abstract
In this paper we prove soundness and completeness of some epistemic extensions of G\"odel fuzzy logic, based on Kripke models in which both propositions at each state and accessibility relations take values in [0,1]. We adopt belief as our epistemic operator, acknowledging that the axiom of Truth may not always hold. We propose the axiomatic system KF serves as a fuzzy variant of classical epistemic logic K, then by considering consistent belief and adding positive introspection and Truth axioms to the axioms of KF, the axiomatic extensions BF and TF are established. To demonstrate the completeness of KF, we present a novel approach that characterizes formulas semantically equivalent to and we introduce a grammar describing formulas with this property. Furthermore, it is revealed that validity in KF cannot be reduced to the class of all models having crisp accessibility relations, and also KF does not enjoy the finite model property. These properties distinguish KF as a new modal extension of G\"odel fuzzy logic which differs from the standard G\"odel Modal Logics G and G proposed by Caicedo and O. Rodriguez.
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