Restart-Based Security Mechanisms for Safety-Critical Embedded Systems

Abstract

Many physical plants that are controlled by embedded systems have safety requirements that need to be respected at all times - any deviations from expected behavior can result in damage to the system (often to the physical plant), the environment or even endanger human life. In recent times, malicious attacks against such systems have increased - many with the intent to cause physical damage. In this paper, we aim to decouple the safety of the plant from security of the embedded system by taking advantage of the inherent inertia in such systems. In this paper we present a system-wide restart-based framework that combines hardware and software components to (a) maintain the system within the safety region and (b) thwart potential attackers from destabilizing the system. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach using two realistic systems - an actual 3 degree of freedom (3-DoF) helicopter and a simulated warehouse temperature control unit. Our proof-of-concept implementation is tested against multiple emulated attacks on the control units of these systems.