Kuramoto dilemma alleviated by optimizing connectivity and rationality

Abstract

Recently, Antonioni and Cardillo proposed a coevolutionary model based on the intertwining of oscillator synchronization and evolutionary game theory [Phys. Rev. Lett. \textbf{118}, 238301 (2017)], in which each Kuramoto oscillator can decide whether to interact-or not-with its neighbors, and all oscillators can receive some benefits from the local synchronization but those who choose to interact must pay a cost. Oscillators are allowed to update their strategies according to payoff difference, wherein the strategy of an oscillator who has obtained higher payoff is more likely to be followed. Utilizing this coevolutionary model, we find that the global synchronization level reaches the highest level when the average degree of the underlying interaction network is moderate. We also study how synchronization is affected by the individual rationality in choosing strategy.