Satellite quantum communications when man-in-the-middle attacks are excluded

Abstract

An application of quantum communications is the transmission of qubits to create shared symmetric encryption keys in a process called Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). Contrary to public-private key encryption, symmetric encryption is safe from (quantum) computing attacks, i.e. it provides forward security and is thus attractive for secure communications. In this paper we argue that for free-space quantum communications, especially with satellites, if one assumes that man-in-the-middle attacks can be detected by classical channel monitoring techniques, simplified quantum communications protocols and hardware systems can be implemented that offer improved key rates. We term these protocols photon key distribution (PKD) to differentiate them from the standard QKD protocols. We identify three types of photon sources and calculate asymptotic secret key rates for PKD protocols and compare them to their QKD counterparts. Results show that PKD protocols have roughly a factor of two higher rates as only one measurement basis is used and due to the relaxed security assumptions can establish keys at very high losses whereas in QKD the privacy amplification process becomes prohibitive.