Towards Resilient 5G: Lessons Learned from Experimental Evaluations of LTE Uplink Jamming

Abstract

Energy, water, health, transportation and emergency services act as backbones for our society. Aiming at high degrees of efficiency, these systems are increasingly automated, depending on communication systems. However, this makes these Critical Infrastructures (CI) prone to cyber attacks, resulting in data leaks, reduced performance or even total system failure. Beyond a survey of existing vulnerabilities, we provide an experimental evaluation of targeted uplink jamming against LTE's air interface. Primarily, our implementations of smart attacks on the LTE Physical Uplink Control Channel (PUCCH), the Physical Uplink Shared Channel (PUSCH) as well as on the radio access procedure are outlined and tested. In exploiting the unencrypted resource assignment process, these attacks are able to target and jam specific UE resources, effectively denying uplink access. Evaluation results reveal the criticality of such attacks, severely destabilizing CI, while minimizing attacker exposure. Finally we derive possible mitigations and recommendations for 5G stakeholders, which serve to improve the robustness of mission critical communications and enable the design of resilient next generation mobile networks.