Feature-Based Q-Learning for Two-Player Stochastic Games

Abstract

Consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic game where the transition function can be embedded in a given feature space. We propose a two-player Q-learning algorithm for approximating the Nash equilibrium strategy via sampling. The algorithm is shown to find an ε-optimal strategy using sample size linear to the number of features. To further improve its sample efficiency, we develop an accelerated algorithm by adopting techniques such as variance reduction, monotonicity preservation and two-sided strategy approximation. We prove that the algorithm is guaranteed to find an ε-optimal strategy using no more than O(K/(ε2(1-γ)4)) samples with high probability, where K is the number of features and γ is a discount factor. The sample, time and space complexities of the algorithm are independent of original dimensions of the game.

0

Turn this paper into a lesson

ArcXiv compiles a structured reading guide from this paper's metadata: plain-English importance, contributions, prerequisite concepts, which sections to read first, flashcards, and a quiz. Grounded in the abstract, never invented.

Discussion (0)

Sign in to join the discussion.

Loading comments…