An Accelerated Stackelberg Game Approach for Distributed Energy Resource Aggregator participating in Energy and Reserve Markets Considering Security Check

Abstract

With increasing distributed energy resoures (DERs) integration, the strategic behavior of a DER aggregator in electricity markets will significantly affect the secure operation of the distribution system. In this paper, the interactions among the DER aggregator, energy and reserve markets, and distribution system are investigated through a single-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg game model with the DER aggregator as the leader and the independent system operator and distribution system operator as the followers. To guarantee the operation security of the distribution system, security check problems under three different scenarios are involved in the follower level, which is linearized using a mixed-integer linearized power flow model. Then, using the strong duality theorem, the proposed model is converted into a bi-level mixed-integer linear (BMILP) programming model with only mixed-integer linear follower-level problems. Next, an accelerated relaxation-based bi-level reformulation and decomposition algorithm is proposed to solve the BMILP problem. Finally, case studies are carried out on a constructed integrated transmission and distribution (T&D) system and a practical integrated T&D system to verify the effectiveness of the proposed model and algorithm. The simulation results indicate that the available downward reserve of the DER aggregator will decrease with the security limitation of the distribution system.