A Continuous Paradoxical Colouring Rule Using Group Action
Abstract
Given a probability space (X, B, m), measure preserving transformations g1, … , gk of X, and a colour set C, a colouring rule is a way to colour the space with C such that the colours allowed for a point x are determined by that point's location and the colours of the finitely g1 (x), … , gk(x) with gi(x) = x for all i and almost all x. We represent a colouring rule as a correspondence F defined on X× Ck with values in C. A function f: X→ C satisfies the rule at x if f(x) ∈ F( x, f(g1 x), … , f(gk x)). A colouring rule is paradoxical if it can be satisfied in some way almost everywhere with respect to m, but not in any way that is measurable with respect to a finitely additive measure that extends the probability measure m and for which the finitely many transformations g1, … , gk remain measure preserving. We show that a colouring rule can be paradoxical when the g1, …, gk are members of a group G, the probability space X and the colour set C are compact sets, C is convex and finite dimensional, and the colouring rule says if c: X→ C is the colouring function then the colour c(x) must lie (m a.e.) in F(x, c(g1(x) ), … , c(gk(x))) for a non-empty upper-semi-continuous convex-valued correspondence F defined on X× Ck. We show that any colouring that approximates the correspondence by ε for small enough positive ε cannot be measurable in the same finitely additive way. Furthermore any function satisfying the colouring rule illustrates a paradox through finitely many measure preserving shifts defining injective maps from the whole space to subsets of measure summing up to less than one.
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