On the Information-theoretic Security of Combinatorial All-or-nothing Transforms

Abstract

All-or-nothing transforms (AONT) were proposed by Rivest as a message preprocessing technique for encrypting data to protect against brute-force attacks, and have numerous applications in cryptography and information security. Later the unconditionally secure AONT and their combinatorial characterization were introduced by Stinson. Informally, a combinatorial AONT is an array with the unbiased requirements and its security properties in general depend on the prior probability distribution on the inputs $s$-tuples. Recently, it was shown by Esfahani and Stinson that a combinatorial AONT has perfect security provided that all the inputs $s$-tuples are equiprobable, and has weak security provided that all the inputs $s$-tuples are with non-zero probability. This paper aims to explore on the gap between perfect security and weak security for combinatorial $(t,s,v)$-AONTs. Concretely, we consider the typical scenario that all the $s$ inputs take values independently (but not necessarily identically) and quantify the amount of information $H(\mathcal{X}|\mathcal{Y})$ about any $t$ inputs $\mathcal{X}$ that is not revealed by any $s-t$ outputs $\mathcal{Y}$. In particular, we establish the general lower and upper bounds on $H(\mathcal{X}|\mathcal{Y})$ for combinatorial AONTs using information-theoretic techniques, and also show that the derived bounds can be attained in certain cases. Furthermore, the discussions are extended for the security properties of combinatorial asymmetric AONTs.