Computational Complexity of Multi-Player Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
Abstract
In this paper we study the computational complexity of computing an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in multi-player symmetric games. For two-player games, deciding existence of an ESS is complete for 2 , the second level of the polynomial time hierarchy. We show that deciding existence of an ESS of a multi-player game is closely connected to the second level of the real polynomial time hierarchy. Namely, we show that the problem is hard for a complexity class we denote as ∃ D . ∀ R and is a member of ∃∀ R, where the former class restrict the latter by having the existentially quantified variables be Boolean rather then real-valued. As a special case of our results it follows that deciding whether a given strategy is an ESS is complete for ∀ R. A concept strongly related to ESS is that of a locally superior strategy (LSS). We extend our results about ESS and show that deciding existence of an LSS of a multiplayer game is likewise hard for ∃ D ∀ R and a member of ∃∀ R, and as a special case that deciding whether a given strategy is an LSS is complete for ∀ R.
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