A Measure Theoretic Paradox from a continuous colouring rule
Abstract
Given a probability space (X, B, m), measure preserving transformations g1, … , gk of X, and a colour set C, a colouring rule is a way to colour the space with C such that the colours allowed for apoint x are determined by that point's location and the colours of the finitely g1 (x), … , gk(x) with gi(x) = x for all i and almost all x. We represent a colouring rule as a correspondence F defined on X× Ck with values in C. A function f: X→ C satisfies the rule at x if f(x) ∈ F( x, f(g1 x), … , f(gk x)). A colouring rule is paradoxical if it can be satisfied in some way almost everywhere with respect to m, but not in any way that is measurable with respect to a finitely additive measure that extends the probability measure m defined on B and for which the finitely many transformations g1, … , gk remain measure preserving. Can a colouring rule be paradoxical if both X and the colour set C are convex and compact sets and the colouring rule says if c: X→ C is the colouring function then the colour c(x) must lie (m a.e.) in F(x, c(g1(x) ), … , c(gk(x))) for a non-empty upper-semi-continuous convex-valued correspondence F defined on X× Ck? The answer is yes, and we present such an example. We show that this result is robust, including that any colouring that approximates the correspondence by ε for small enough positive ε also cannot be measurable in the same finitely additive way. Because non-empty upper-semi-continuous convex-valued correspondences on Euclidean space can be approximated by continuous functions, there are paradoxical colouring rules that are defined by continuous functions.
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