MF-OMO: An Optimization Formulation of Mean-Field Games

Abstract

This paper proposes a new mathematical paradigm to analyze discrete-time mean-field games. It is shown that finding Nash equilibrium solutions for a general class of discrete-time mean-field games is equivalent to solving an optimization problem with bounded variables and simple convex constraints, called MF-OMO. This equivalence framework enables finding multiple (and possibly all) Nash equilibrium solutions of mean-field games by standard algorithms. For instance, projected gradient descent is shown to be capable of retrieving all possible Nash equilibrium solutions when there are finitely many of them, with proper initializations. Moreover, analyzing mean-field games with linear rewards and mean-field independent dynamics is reduced to solving a finite number of linear programs, hence solvable in finite time. This framework does not rely on the contractive and the monotone assumptions and the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.