Combinatorics of Correlated Equilibria

Abstract

We study the correlated equilibrium polytope PG of a game G from a combinatorial point of view. We introduce the region of full-dimensionality for this class of polytopes and prove that it is a semialgebraic set for any game. Using a stratification via oriented matroids, we propose a structured method for describing the possible combinatorial types of PG, and show that for (2 × n)-games, the algebraic boundary of the stratification is a union of coordinate hyperplanes and binomial hypersurfaces. Finally, we provide a computational proof that there exists a unique combinatorial type of maximal dimension for generic (2 × 3)-games.

0

Turn this paper into a lesson

ArcXiv compiles a structured reading guide from this paper's metadata: plain-English importance, contributions, prerequisite concepts, which sections to read first, flashcards, and a quiz. Grounded in the abstract, never invented.

Discussion (0)

Sign in to join the discussion.

Loading comments…