Discrete & Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms

Abstract

Cryptocurrencies employ auction-esque transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) to allocate transactions to blocks, and to determine how much fees miners can collect from transactions. Several impossibility results show that TFMs that satisfy a standard set of "good" properties obtain low revenue, and in certain cases, no revenue at all. In this work, we circumvent previous impossibilities by showing that when desired TFM properties are reasonably relaxed, simple mechanisms can obtain strictly positive revenue. By discretizing fees, we design a TFM that satisfies the extended TFM desiderata: it is dominant strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC), myopic miner incentive-compatible (MMIC), side-contract-proof (SCP) and obtains asymptotically optimal revenue (i.e., linear in the number of allocated bids), and optimal revenue when considering separable TFMs. If instead of discretizing fees we relax the DSIC and SCP properties, we show that Bitcoin's TFM, after applying the revelation principle, is Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC), MMIC, off-chain-agreement (OCA) proof, and approximately revenue-optimal. We reach our results by characterizing the class of multi-item OCA-proof mechanisms, which may be of independent interest.