Prophet Inequalities for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions

Abstract

In this paper, we survey literature on prophet inequalities for subadditive combinatorial auctions. We give an overview of the previous best O( m) prophet inequality as well as the preceding O( m) prophet inequality. Then, we provide the constructive posted price mechanisms used in order to prove the two bounds. We mainly focus on the most recent literature that resolves a central open problem in this area of discovering a constant factor prophet inequality for subadditive valuations. We detail the approach of this new paper, which is non-constructive and therefore cannot be implemented using prices, as done in previous literature.

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