Votemandering: Strategies and Fairness in Political Redistricting

Abstract

Gerrymandering, the deliberate manipulation of electoral district boundaries for political advantage, is a persistent issue in U.S. redistricting cycles. This paper introduces and analyzes a new phenomenon, 'votemandering'- a strategic blend of gerrymandering and targeted political campaigning, devised to gain more seats by circumventing fairness measures. It leverages accurate demographic and socio-political data to influence voter decisions, bolstered by advancements in technology and data analytics, and executes better-informed redistricting. Votemandering is established as a Mixed Integer Program (MIP) that performs fairness-constrained gerrymandering over multiple election rounds, via unit-specific variables for campaigns. To combat votemandering, we present a computationally efficient heuristic for creating and testing district maps that more robustly preserve voter preferences. We analyze the influence of various redistricting constraints and parameters on votemandering efficacy. We explore the interconnectedness of gerrymandering, substantial campaign budgets, and strategic campaigning, illustrating their collective potential to generate biased electoral maps. A Wisconsin State Senate redistricting case study substantiates our findings on real data, demonstrating how major parties can secure additional seats through votemandering. Our findings underscore the practical implications of these manipulations, stressing the need for informed policy and regulation to safeguard democratic processes.