Secretary Problems with Random Number of Candidates: How Prior Distributional Information Helps
Abstract
We study variants of the secretary problem, where N, the number of candidates, is a random variable, and the decision maker wants to maximize the probability of success -- picking the largest number among the N candidates -- using only the relative ranks of the candidates revealed so far. We consider three forms of prior information about p, the probability distribution of N. In the full information setting, we assume p to be fully known. In that case, we show that single-threshold type of strategies can achieve 1/e-approximation to the maximum probability of success among all possible strategies. In the upper bound setting, we assume that N≤ n (or E[N]≤ μ), where n (or μ) is known. In that case, we show that randomization over single-threshold type of strategies can achieve the optimal worst case probability of success of 1(n) (or 1(μ)) asymptotically. Surprisingly, there is a single-threshold strategy (depending on n) that can succeed with probability 2/e2 for all but an exponentially small fraction of distributions supported on [n]. In the sampling setting, we assume that we have access to m samples N(1),…,N(m)iid p. In that case, we show that if N≤ T with probability at least 1-O(ε) for some T∈ N, m 1ε2((1ε),ε ((T)ε)) is enough to learn a strategy that is at least ε-suboptimal, and we provide a lower bound of (1ε2), showing that the sampling algorithm is optimal when ε=O(1(T)).
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