Optimally combined incentive for cooperation among interacting agents in population games

Abstract

Combined prosocial incentives, integrating reward for cooperators and punishment for defectors, are effective tools to promote cooperation among competing agents in population games. Existing research concentrated on how to adjust reward or punishment, as two mutually exclusive tools, during the evolutionary process to achieve the desired proportion of cooperators in the population, and less attention has been given to exploring a combined incentive-based control policy that can steer the system to the full cooperation state at the lowest cost. In this work we propose a combined incentive scheme in a population of agents whose conflicting interactions are described by the prisoner's dilemma game on complete graphs and regular networks, respectively. By devising an index function for quantifying the implementation cost of the combined incentives, we analytically construct the optimally combined incentive protocol by using optimal control theory. By means of theoretical analysis, we identify the mathematical conditions, under which the optimally combined incentive scheme requires the minimal amount of cost. In addition to numerical calculations, we further perform computer simulations to verify our theoretical results and explore their robustness on different types of network structures.