Modeling Processes of Neighborhood Change

Abstract

An urban planner might design the spatial layout of transportation amenities so as to improve accessibility for underserved communities -- a fairness objective. However, implementing such a design might trigger processes of neighborhood change that change who benefits from these amenities in the long term. If so, has the planner really achieved their fairness objective? Can algorithmic decision-making anticipate second order effects? In this paper, we take a step in this direction by formulating processes of neighborhood change as instances of no-regret dynamics; a collective learning process in which a set of strategic agents rapidly reach a state of approximate equilibrium. We mathematize concepts of neighborhood change to model the incentive structures impacting individual dwelling-site decision-making. Our model accounts for affordability, access to relevant transit amenities, community ties, and site upkeep. We showcase our model with computational experiments that provide semi-quantitative insights on the spatial economics of neighborhood change, particularly on the influence of residential zoning policy and the placement of transit amenities.