Whispers in the Machine: Confidentiality in Agentic Systems

Abstract

Large language model (LLM)-based agents combine LLMs with external tools to automate tasks such as scheduling meetings, managing documents, or booking travel. While these integrations unlock powerful capabilities, they also create new and more severe attack surfaces. In particular, prompt injection attacks become far more dangerous in the agentic setting: malicious instructions embedded in connected services can misdirect the agent, providing a direct pathway for sensitive data to be exfiltrated. Yet, despite a growing number of real-world incidents, the confidentiality risks of such systems remain poorly understood. To address this gap, we provide a formalization of confidentiality in LLM-based agents. By abstracting sensitive data as a secret string, we evaluate ten agents across 20 tool scenarios and 14 attack strategies. We find that all agents are vulnerable to at least one attack, and existing defenses fail to provide reliable protection against these threats. Strikingly, we find that the tooling itself can amplify leakage risks.