Towards a Bayesian mechanics of metacognitive particles: A commentary on "Path integrals, particular kinds, and strange things" by Friston, Da Costa, Sakthivadivel, Heins, Pavliotis, Ramstead, and Parr

Abstract

What could metacognition look like in simple physical terms? We define metacognition as having beliefs about beliefs, which can be articulated very simply using the language of statistical physics and Bayesian mechanics. We introduce a typology between cognitive and metacognitive particles and develop an example of a metacognitive particle. This can be generalized to provide examples of higher forms of metacognition: i.e. particles having beliefs about beliefs about beliefs and so forth. We conclude by saying that the typology of particles laid down in the target article seems promising, for seemingly enabling a physics of cognition that builds upon and refines the free energy principle, toward a physical description of entities that specifically possess higher forms of cognition.