Cooperation, Correlation and Competition in Ergodic N-player Games and Mean-field Games of Singular Controls: A Case Study

Abstract

We consider a class of $N$-player games and mean-field games of singular controls with ergodic performance criterion, providing a benchmark case for irreversible investment games featuring mean-field interaction and strategic complementarities. The state of each player follows a geometric Brownian motion, controlled additively through a nondecreasing process, while agents seek to maximize a long-term average reward functional with a power-type instantaneous profit, under strategic complementarity. We explore three different notions of optimality, which, in the mean-field limit, correspond to the mean-field control solution, mean-field coarse correlated equilibria, and mean-field Nash equilibria. We explicitly compute equilibria in the three cases and compare them numerically, in terms of yielded payoffs and existence conditions. Finally, we show that the mean-field control and mean-field equilibria can approximate the cooperative and competitive equilibria, respectively, in the corresponding $N$-player game when $N$ is sufficiently large. Our analysis of the mean-field control problem features a novel Lagrange multiplier approach, which proves crucial in establishing the approximation result, while the treatment of mean-field coarse correlated equilibria necessitates a new, specifically tailored definition for the stationary setting.