Distribution System Reconfiguration to Mitigate Load Altering Attacks via Stackelberg Games

Abstract

The widespread integration of IoT-controllable devices (e.g., smart EV charging stations and heat pumps) into modern power systems enhances capabilities but introduces critical cybersecurity risks. Specifically, these devices are susceptible to load-altering attacks (LAAs) that can compromise power system safety. This paper quantifies the impact of LAAs on nodal voltage constraint violations in distribution networks (DNs). We first present closed-form expressions to analytically characterize LAA effects and quantify the minimum number of compromised devices for a successful LAA. Based on these insights, we propose a reactive defense mechanism that mitigates LAAs through DN reconfiguration. To address strategic adversaries, we then formulate defense strategies using a non-cooperative sequential game, which models the knowledgeable and strategic attacker, accounting for the worst-case scenario and enabling the reactive defender to devise an efficient and robust defense. Further, our formulation also accounts for uncertainties in attack localization. A novel Bayesian optimization approach is introduced to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium, significantly reducing computational burden efficiently. The game-theoretic strategy effectively mitigates the attack's impact while ensuring minimal system reconfiguration.