A Novel Voting System for Medical Catalogues in National Health Insurance
Abstract
This study explores the conceptual development of a medical insurance catalogue voting system. The methodology is centred on creating a model where doctors would vote on treatment inclusions, aiming to demonstrate transparency and integrity. The results from Monte Carlo simulations suggest a robust consensus on the selection of medicines and treatments. Further theoretical investigations propose incorporating a patient outcome-based incentive mechanism. This conceptual approach could enhance decision-making in healthcare by aligning stakeholder interests with patient outcomes, aiming for an optimised, equitable insurance catalogue with potential blockchain-based smart-contracts to ensure transparency and integrity.
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