On the Oscillations in Cournot Games with Best Response Strategies
Abstract
In this paper, we consider the dynamic oscillation in the Cournot oligopoly model, which involves multiple firms producing homogeneous products. To explore the oscillation under the updates of best response strategies, we focus on the linear price functions. In this setting, we establish the existence of oscillations. In particular, we show that for the scenario of different costs among firms, the best response converges to either a unique equilibrium or a two-period oscillation. We further characterize the oscillations and propose linear-time algorithms for finding all types of two-period oscillations. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first step toward fully analyzing the periodic oscillation in the Cournot oligopoly model.
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