The Co-evolution of Cooperation and Epidemic Spreading

Abstract

People's cooperation in adopting protective measures is effective in epidemic control and creates herd immunity as a public good. Similarly, the presence of an epidemic is a driving factor for the formation and improvement of cooperation. Here, we study the coevolution of epidemic dynamics and the public good game as a paradigm of cooperation dynamics. Using simulations and a mean-field description, we show that the presence of an epidemic can promote cooperation even in regimes where cooperation would not naturally emerge in the standard public good game. The coupling of the two dynamics leads to a rich phenomenology, such as the more efficient control of epidemics, instead of higher cooperation, when the economic benefit of cooperation increases, or higher cooperation, but not higher disease spread, when disease transmission probability increases. Besides, our work shows that a higher altruistic effect of cooperation in controlling the disease can only be detrimental to the evolution of cooperation and disease control. Rather, individuals' choices in adopting costly preventive measures are predominantly driven by the self-interested effect of such measures in reducing the probability of getting infected.