Adaptively secure unitary designs with constant non-Clifford cost

Abstract

Randomness is a fundamental resource in quantum information, with crucial applications in cryptography, algorithms, and error correction. A central challenge is to construct unitary $k$-designs that closely approximate Haar-random unitaries while minimizing the costly use of non-Clifford operations. In this work, we present a protocol able to generate unitary $k$-designs on $n$ qubits, secure against any adversarial quantum measurement, with a system-size-independent number of non-Clifford gates. Our construction applies a $k$-design only to a subsystem of size $Θ(k)$, independent of $n$. This ``seed'' design is then ``diluted'' across the entire $n$-qubit system by sandwiching it between two random Clifford operators. The resulting ensemble forms an $\varepsilon$-approximate unitary $k$-design on $n$ qubits. We prove that this construction achieves full quantum security against adaptive adversaries using only $\tilde{O}(k^2 \log\varepsilon^{-1})$ non-Clifford gates. If one requires security only against polynomial-time adaptive adversaries, the non-Clifford cost decreases to $\tilde{O}(k + \log^{1+c} \varepsilon^{-1})$. This is optimal, since we show that at least $Ω(k)$ non-Clifford gates are required in this setting. Compared to existing approaches, our method significantly reduces non-Clifford overhead while strengthening security guarantees to adaptive security as well as removing artificial assumptions between $n$ and $k$. These results make high-order unitary designs practically attainable in near-term fault-tolerant quantum architectures.