Likelihood of the Existence of Average Justified Representation
Abstract
We study the approval-based multi-winner election problem where n voters jointly decide a committee of k winners from m candidates. We focus on the axiom average justified representation (AJR) proposed by Fernandez, Elkind, Lackner, Garcia, Arias-Fisteus, Basanta-Val, and Skowron (2017). AJR postulates that every group of voters with a common preference should be sufficiently represented in that their average satisfaction should be no less than their Hare quota. Formally, for every group of ·nk voters with common approved candidates, the average number of approved winners for this group should be at least . It is well-known that a winning committee satisfying AJR is not guaranteed to exist for all multi-winner election instances. In this paper, we study the likelihood of the existence of AJR under the Erdos--R\'enyi model. We consider the Erdos--R\'enyi model parameterized by p∈[0,1] that samples multi-winner election instances from the distribution where each voter approves each candidate with probability p (and the events that voters approve candidates are independent), and we provide a clean and complete characterization of the existence of AJR committees in the case where m is a constant and n tends to infinity. We show that there are two phase transition points p1 and p2 (with p1≤ p2) for the parameter p such that: 1) when p<p1 or p>p2, an AJR committee exists with probability 1-o(1), 2) when p1<p<p2, an AJR committee exists with probability o(1), and 3) when p=p1 or p=p2, the probability that an AJR committee exists is bounded away from both 0 and 1.
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