An Inference-Based Architecture for Intent and Affordance Saturation in Decision-Making

Abstract

Decision paralysis, i.e. hesitation, freezing, or failure to act despite full knowledge and motivation, poses a challenge for choice models that assume options are already specified and readily comparable. Drawing on qualitative reports in autism research that are especially salient, we propose a computational account in which paralysis arises from convergence failure in a hierarchical decision process. We separate intent selection (what to pursue) from affordance selection (how to pursue the goal) and formalize commitment as inference under a mixture of reverse- and forward-Kullback-Leibler (KL) objectives. Reverse KL is mode-seeking and promotes rapid commitment, whereas forward KL is mode-covering and preserves multiple plausible goals or actions. In static and dynamic (drift-diffusion) models, forward-KL-biased inference yields slow, heavy-tailed response times and two distinct failure modes, intent saturation and affordance saturation, when values are similar. Simulations in multi-option tasks reproduce key features of decision inertia and shutdown, treating autism as an extreme regime of a general, inference-based, decision-making continuum.