The value of random zero-sum games

Abstract

We study the value of a two-player zero-sum game on a random matrix M∈ Rn× m, defined by v(M) = x∈ny∈ mxT M y. In the setting where n=m and M has i.i.d. standard Gaussian entries, we prove that the standard deviation of v(M) is of order 1n. This confirms an experimental conjecture dating back to the 1980s. We also investigate the case where M is a rectangular Gaussian matrix with m = n+λn, showing that the expected value of the game is of order λn, as well as the case where M is a random orthogonal matrix. Our techniques are based on probabilistic arguments and convex geometry. We argue that the study of random games could shed new light on various problems in theoretical computer science.

0

Turn this paper into a full lesson

ArcXiv compiles a staged curriculum from this paper: 8-12 lessons across beginner → advanced, synthesised section guides, visuals, flashcards, a quiz, exercises, and on-demand deep dives per section. Grounded in the abstract, never invented.

Discussion (0)

Sign in to join the discussion.

Loading comments…