ZK-ACE: Identity-Centric Zero-Knowledge Authorization for Post-Quantum Blockchain Systems

Abstract

Post-quantum signature schemes impose kilobyte-scale on-chain artifacts. Verifying them inside ZK circuits merely relocates the cost via expensive lattice arithmetic in prover circuits. We present ZK-ACE (Zero-Knowledge Authorization for Cryptographic Entities), which replaces transaction-carried signature objects with identity-bound ZK statements. Given a deterministic identity derivation primitive (DIDP) as a black box, the prover demonstrates in zero knowledge that an identity consistent with an on-chain commitment authorized the transaction; no signature object is produced or verified on-chain. We provide game-based definitions and reduction-based proofs for authorization soundness, replay resistance, substitution resistance, and cross-domain separation, under knowledge soundness, collision resistance, and DIDP recovery hardness. Structural data accounting shows an order-of-magnitude reduction in per-transaction authorization data versus direct PQC deployment. A reference implementation offers two backends: Circle STARK (341 active rows / 361 AIR constraint expressions, 14.5 ms prove, 1.1 ms verify, approx. 107 KB proofs, transparent setup, post-quantum-oriented) and Groth16/BN254 (2,155 R1CS constraints, 37.3 ms prove, 128-byte proofs). Both are roughly 500--2,300x smaller than in-circuit PQC signature verification. Under mandatory per-block STARK aggregation, per-transaction consensus-visible data is approx. 160 bytes.