Aquaman: A Transparent Proxy Architecture for Quantum Resilient Key Establishment

Abstract

The harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL) threat--adversaries intercepting and archiving ciphertext today for retrospective decryption once quantum computers mature--turns the future quantum threat into a present liability for the public-key primitives (RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECC) that anchor modern session-key exchange. We present Aquaman, a transparent-proxy architecture for quantum-resilient session-key establishment. A transparent proxy intercepts session-key requests at the edge of a trusted network without requiring client-side configuration, deploying quantum-resistant capability at the network boundary on behalf of clients that may themselves lack post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Aquaman supports four operating modes: PQC offloaded to the proxy for clients without trusted PQC stacks; classical multi-path key fragmentation over heterogeneous media (with an optional anonymous proxy-pool variant); QKD with the SKIP/ETSI GS QKD 014 key-delivery interface; and classical/PQC hybrid handshakes. We implement and evaluate the first two modes; the latter two are well-trodden in the PQC literature and we discuss but do not implement them. The implemented multi-path mode splits the session key into ciphertext fragments distributed across diverse media (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, NFC, cellular, Ethernet); reconstruction requires all fragments. We formalize the security argument and prove that recovery probability decays as (B/d)^n in the diversity dimension. A 1,000-run prototype evaluation on AWS EC2 shows that latency is dominated by network transmission, not by multi-path overhead.