Equilibrium and Pricing in Consumer Networks with Nonlinear Utilities: An Online Shape-Constrained Learning Approach

Abstract

We study optimal monopoly pricing over consumer networks governed by general nonlinear utilities. In our framework, a consumer's utility is jointly determined by an individualized price and the consumption choices of their peers, propagated through a directed and signed social graph. This formulation encapsulates a broad class of utility functions; it strictly generalizes the traditional linear-quadratic framework to include logit-type discrete choice, isoelastic, and Stone-Geary utilities under a single theoretical umbrella. We first establish the existence and uniqueness of the consumer-side equilibrium under general contraction and variational conditions, explicitly accommodating asymmetric and signed network externalities. Leveraging this equilibrium characterization, we analyze targeted price discrimination within community-structured and influencer-driven markets. To this end, we introduce a generalized measure of network influence that extends classical Katz-Bonacich centrality beyond the Euclidean domain. Finally, addressing the challenge of unknown consumer utility functions, we develop a shape-constrained, tuning-parameter-free learning approach utilizing isotonic regression, for which we establish strict no-regret convergence guarantees. Supported by extensive simulations, our results seamlessly integrate equilibrium analysis and nonparametric learning into a cohesive monopoly pricing framework.