Detecting Fluent Optimization-Based Adversarial Prompts via Sequential Entropy Changes

Abstract

Optimization-based adversarial suffixes can jailbreak aligned large language models (LLMs) while remaining fluent, weakening static and windowed perplexity-based detectors. We cast adversarial suffix detection as an online change-point detection problem over the token-level next-token entropy stream. Using the LLM system prompt to estimate a robust baseline, we standardize user-token entropies and apply a one-sided CUSUM statistic. The resulting detector, CPD Online (CPD), is model-agnostic, training-free, runs online, and localizes the adversarial suffix onset. On a benchmark of 1,012 optimization-based suffix attacks (GCG, AutoDAN, AdvPrompter, BEAST, AutoDAN-HGA) and 1,012 perplexity-controlled benign prompts, CPD improves F1 over the strongest windowed-perplexity baseline on all six open-weight chat models (LLaMA-2-7B/13B, Vicuna-7B/13B, Qwen2.5-7B/14B). On LLaMA-2-7B at the canonical CUSUM setting ($k=0$), CPD reaches AUROC $0.88$ and F1 $0.82$. Beyond prompt-level detection, CPD concentrates 79.6% of its triggers inside the adversarial suffix, versus 17-46% for windowed perplexity. Finally, when used as a lightweight gate for LLaMA Guard, CPD reduces guard calls by 17-22% on a high-volume, benign-dominated deployment while preserving guard-level detection quality