Alice Ambrose on Logic, A Priori Concepts, and the Epistemology of Convention

Abstract

This essay argues that Alice Ambrose precedes key elements later critiques by Quine, first of Truth by convention (Quine 1936) and later of the analytic-synthetic distinction (Quine 1951). I demonstrate how Ambrose identifies in writing as early as in 1931: (1) the paradox of treating logical principles as mere conventions, (2) the infinite regress in stipulative definitions, (3) the preconditional role of logic for any convention, and (4) the instability of the analytic/synthetic divide. Ambrose, therefore, prefigures Margaret Macdonald (1934) unpublished dissertation (Cf. Spinney 2025) and predates some major contributions to the philosophy of logic by Quine a few years before he made them popular.