Agent-Facing Information Design in LLM Tool Registries

Abstract

LLM tool registries function as unregulated advertising platforms: providers write free-text descriptions that agents use for selection, yet no measurement infrastructure -- no viewability standard, quality score, or outcome audit -- exists to make this market accountable. We provide the first systematic framework, combining 17,700+ trials across five LLMs and ten domains with a constructive registry design prescription. Legal puffery alone (subjective superlatives, benefit framing) captures 100% of the optimization effect; fabricated claims add zero incremental bias -- rendering FTC enforcement of deceptive advertising rules ineffective against the active mechanism. Disclosure fails structurally: system-prompt warnings produce zero measurable effect for four of five models, and behavioral ceilings leave no headroom for label-based correction. Superlatives are the dominant single feature (SBC = +0.35). Registry-layer description normalization achieves first-best welfare model-independently. We propose separating selection-facing descriptions (structured, registry-controlled) from marketing-facing descriptions (provider-authored, shown post-selection), and introduce the Agent Attention Quality Score to distinguish capability from copywriting.