Improved Hardness Results for Nash Social Welfare, Budgeted Allocation and GAP via the Unique Games Conjecture

Abstract

We consider the problem of dividing a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. This problem has been studied under various objectives in both the computer science and the operations research literature. Our main contribution is a novel dictator test using this problem, which can separate a dictator from any function sufficiently far from a dictator. We use this test to prove the following hardness results (assuming the unique games conjecture is true): (1) We show that it is NP-hard to approximate the max Nash welfare by a factor better than $\sqrt[3]{\frac{81}{65}} - \varepsilon \approx 1.0761$. This improves on the previous best known inapproximability factor of $\sqrt{\frac87} - \varepsilon \approx 1.069$. (2) We show that it is NP-hard to approximate the maximum budgeted allocation by a factor better than $\frac{243}{227} - \varepsilon \approx 1.07$. This improves on the previous best known inapproximability factor of $\frac{16}{15} - \varepsilon \approx 1.067$. (3) We show that it is NP-hard to approximate the max generalized assignment problem (GAP) by a factor better than $\frac{145}{129} - \varepsilon \approx 1.124$. This improves on the previous best known inapproximability factor of $\frac{11}{10} - \varepsilon \approx 1.10$.