It's Safer to Give Personhood to Bears than to Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI) developers are rhetorically flirting with the idea that AI systems might have interests or moral rights. While there has been a large volume of research on whether AI deserves rights, there has been less exploration of what AI rights would mean in practice. This paper explores the institutional dimension of AI rights: what it would take to recognize moral or legal rights for AIs, and the attendant opportunities and dangers. Unlike all other nonhuman entities to which humanity has extended rights, AI systems are in principle capable of acquiring and wielding institutional power without human aid and mediation. AIs with rights would be able to legitimately, and AIs with power able to unpreventably, abridge human interests. Accordingly, giving rights even to rather dumb AI systems would entail binding the fate of humanity to potentially unpredictable nonhumans. Accordingly, I defend the rather grandiose claim that to empower AI to claim or to exercise inherent rights would be a world-historical gamble with human self-determination, which no individual researcher, firm, state, or even international organization has the moral right to authorize.