On the Structure and Stability of Boundary Mixed Steady States in Evolutionary Games on Networks

Abstract

We study steady states of evolutionary games on networks in which some players adopt pure strategies while others play mixed strategies. We refer to these configurations as boundary mixed steady states. Such states arise naturally in structured populations and have no counterpart in the classical well-mixed setting. We introduce a relaxed equilibrium notion, called boundary Nash equilibrium, in which the Nash condition is imposed only on non-pure players. In two-strategy systems, this notion characterizes boundary mixed steady states, while this correspondence breaks down in higher dimensions. The stability of these states is governed by the interaction structure among mixed players. When mixed players do not interact, the system exhibits continua of equilibria. In contrast, any nontrivial interaction generically produces instability. In particular, boundary mixed steady states that are not fully degenerate are never asymptotically stable. Degeneracies are further linked to the rank properties of the underlying interaction. These results reveal a structural instability mechanism specific to networked replicator dynamics, highlighting a qualitative gap with respect to the classical well-mixed case and showing how network topology influences the local behavior of equilibria.