Mitigating Polycentric Conflict-Trap Risk in Mali via Intergenerational Volterra Mean-Field-Type Games

Abstract

Persistent instability in Mali and neighboring countries is not a temporary security crisis but a self-reproducing conflict system sustained by intergenerational grievances, climatic shocks, predatory resource extraction, and decentralized war economies. We develop a novel intergenerational Volterra mean-field-type game framework in which historical memory, inherited distrust, revenge incentives, and evolving institutional responses jointly shape future conflict dynamics. The analysis reveals how war entrepreneurs recycle illicit resource revenues through global financial networks, while blunt regulatory interventions can inadvertently accelerate recruitment into armed groups. We design optimal policies that alter the system's long-run geometry, severing the financial and psychological feedback loops of violence. The resulting framework provides a predictive and actionable architecture for durable peace, civilian protection, and multi-generational structural stabilization in the Sahel and beyond.