Reported Confidence in LLMs Tracks Commitment More Than Correctness

Abstract

Confidence is an estimate of the probability that a chosen answer is correct. Verbal confidence reports are widely used as uncertainty measures in large language models, but whether they are best understood as estimates of correctness is unclear. We test this with a two-stage abstention paradigm from the neuroscience of perceptual decision making: a model first answers and reports its confidence, then decides whether to commit it to a user or abstain. Across four non-reasoning models, prompt framings, and confidence formats, verbal confidence predicted the commit/abstain decision substantially better than whether the answer was correct. Calibrated token log-probabilities showed the opposite profile, with abstention-prediction coupled to correctness discrimination, the signature of an answer-evidence signal. After removing the variance verbal confidence shared with log-probabilities, the residual stayed aligned with commitment while its link to correctness fell to near chance. The dissociation generalised to four reasoning models across four benchmarks of varying difficulty, from hard multiple-choice to frontier-level freeform questions. Mechanistic analyses in Gemma 3 and 4 were convergent: a post-answer state known to causally support verbal-confidence generation already encoded the future abstention decision before the abstention prompt, organised mainly by that decision rather than by correctness, the two lying in approximately orthogonal directions in activation space. Steering along a verbal-confidence-specific direction causally shifted abstention. Verbal and log-probability confidence are thus not interchangeable: log-probabilities track answer evidence and correctness, whereas verbal confidence is better understood as a behaviour-facing readout of an internal commit-readiness state, challenging the practice of treating verbal reports as proxies for reliability.