Security of passive entanglement-based key distribution protocols

Abstract

Entanglement-based key distribution protocols, such as the Bennett-Brassard-Mermin 1992 (BBM92) protocol and quantum conference key agreement (QCKA), are promising applications of quantum networks. In practical implementations, passive measurement setups are widely adopted because of their simplicity. However, the security analysis of passive protocols with biased basis choice is highly nontrivial, since standard proof techniques for threshold detectors are generally not applicable in this setting. In this work, we establish the security of passive entanglement-based key distribution protocols in the asymptotic regime. Specifically, we prove the security of passive BBM92 with biased basis choice and extend the proof to passive QCKA with an arbitrary number of parties. In addition, we numerically show that the key generation rate of passive BBM92 is almost identical to that of the corresponding active protocol. Our results provide a theoretical foundation for practical passive implementations of entanglement-based key distribution protocols.