Matching games with partial information
Paolo Laureti, Yi-Cheng Zhang
Abstract
We analyze different ways of pairing agents in a bipartite matching problem, with regard to its scaling properties and to the distribution of individual ``satisfactions''. Then we explore the role of partial information and bounded rationality in a generalized Marriage Problem, comparing the benefits obtained by self-searching and by a matchmaker. Finally we propose a modified matching game intended to mimic the way consumers' information makes firms to enhance the quality of their products in a competitive market.
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