Comments on evolution of cooperation: evolutionary stability in enhanced Dove-Hawk model

Abstract

One of the best examples of traditional analysis of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) is provided by the so called Dove-Hawk model. In this paper we present several enhancements to the model aimed at describing the evolution of cooperative behavior. In addition to Doves and Hawks we introduce several groups of Cooperators, who act as Doves within their own group, but as Hawks outside it. This allows to study how cooperating groups may grow and achieve stability within a nonrepeating evolutionary games framework. Depending on initial conditions, the final stable population may have one, all-encompassing Cooperator population or several competing cliques. After taking into account that Cooperators bear costs necessary to recognize members of one's own group it is possible to see populations where Cooperators eventually lose against Hawks or populations where several cliques of Cooperators coexist with a Hawk population.