Bell's Inequality, Random Sequence, and Quantum Key Distribution
W. -Y. Hwang
Abstract
The Ekert 91 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol appears to be secure whatever devices legitimate users adopt for the protocol, as long as the devices give a result that violates Bell's inequality. However, this is not the case if they ignore non-detection events because Eve can make use of the detection-loophole, as Larrson showed. We show that even when legitimate users take into account non-detection events Eve can successfully eavesdrop if the QKD system has been appropriately designed by the manufacturer. A loophole utilized here is that of `free-choice' (or `real randomness'). Local QKD devices with pseudo-random sequence generator installed in them can apparently violate Bell's inequality.
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