Secure Long-Range Autonomous Valet Parking: A Reservation Scheme With Three-Factor Authentication and Key Agreement
Di Wang, Yue Cao, Fei Yan, Yining Liu, Daxin Tian, Yuan Zhuang
Abstract
Long-range autonomous valet parking (LAVP) is increasingly adopted to alleviate traffic congestion and parking difficulties. For large-scale parking demand, reservation can improve parking management. However, existing schemes mainly focus on parking request verification and parking check-in, and do not adequately protect identity legitimacy and communication security during passenger drop-off and pick-up. To address this problem, we propose SecLAVP, a provably secure three-factor authentication and key agreement protocol for LAVP reservation services. SecLAVP combines passwords, biometrics, and smart cards. With assistance from the drop-off/pick-up point (DP), the passenger and the autonomous vehicle (AV) achieve mutual authentication and establish a session key for secure communication. In the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model, we formally prove that SecLAVP provides session-key security. AVISPA simulations show that SecLAVP resists man-in-the-middle attacks, while informal analysis demonstrates that it satisfies 15 defined security goals. Finally, performance evaluation in terms of communication overhead, computational overhead, and scheduling shows that SecLAVP is feasible for practical deployment.
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